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INTRODUCTION
The amici curiae submit this Brief in support of the appellees and urge the
Court to affirm the decision of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia1 holding that Congress has the power to enact section 1501 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA” or the “Act”) 2 under the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.3 That section requires that, with certain
exceptions, all Americans who can afford a minimum level of health insurance
either purchase such insurance or pay a penalty to the United States Treasury.4
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
All pertinent statutes and regulations are contained in the Brief for
Appellees.
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE5
Amici curiae are professors and scholars in economics who have taught,
studied, and researched the economic forces operating in and affecting the health
1 Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 28-34 (D.D.C. 2011).
2 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
3 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (minimum coverage provision).
5 Counsel for appellants and for the appellees have consented to amici filing this
Brief. No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any
party, person, or entity other than amici and their counsel, make a monetary
contribution to the preparation and submission of this Brief. See Fed. R. App. P.
29 (c) (5).
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care and health insurance markets. The amici include internationally recognized
scholars in economics, including three Nobel laureates,6 two recipients of the John
Bates Clark Medal for the outstanding American economist aged 40 and under,7
and former high-ranking economists in a number of former administrations. The
amici believe that reform of the health care system is essential to constraining the
growth of health care spending and that broadly-based insurance coverage is
essential to any reform of the health care system.
This Brief describes the unique economics of the health care industry and
explains the logical fallacy that there can be “inactivity” or non-participation in the
health care market. Virtually all Americans will, at some time during their life,
require health care, either because of illness, accident, or the wear and tear of age.
The extremely high costs of health care for all but the most routine treatments and
procedures are beyond the means of all but the most wealthy Americans.
Insurance is the means by which we pay for our health care, and the requirements
of section 1501 assure that all Americans who can afford it will contribute to the
costs of their own health care by maintaining reasonable insurance coverage.
Otherwise, those costs will necessarily be borne by others who do buy insurance or
6 The Nobel Laureates are Dr. Kenneth Arrow (1972), Dr. George Akerlof (2001),
and Dr. Eric Maskin (2007).
7 The winners of the John Bates Clark Medal are Dr. Susan Athey (2007) and Dr.
Matthew Rabin (2001).
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by the taxpayers. As former Massachusetts Governor Romney noted when signing
the Massachusetts equivalent of section 1501:
Some of my libertarian friends balk at what looks like an
individual mandate. But remember, someone has to pay
for the health care that must, by law, be provided: Either
the individual pays or the taxpayers pay. A free ride on
the government is not libertarian.8
Amici show also why affirming Congress’s power to enact section 1501 will
not result in some vast expansion of federal power. And they respond to the
economic arguments advanced by the “Amici Economists in Support” in State of
Florida, et al., v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.9 The data
underlying those arguments are flawed, and the “Amici Economists in Support”
fail to recognize that section 1501 is “an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity….” designed to make health care insurance available to the vast
majority of Americans.10
8 Mitt Romney, Health Care for Everyone? We Found A Way, WALL ST. J., Apr.
11, 2006, at A16, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114472206077422547.html/mod=opinion_main_c
ommentaries.
9 See Brief for Amici Curiae Economists in Support of Appellees/Cross Appellants
and Affirmance, State of Florida, et al., v. U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Dkt. Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067 (11th Cir. filed May 11, 2011) (“Amici
Br.”).
10 Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 30 (internal quotations omitted).
USCA Case #11-5047      Document #1316642      Filed: 07/05/2011      Page 19 of 49
- 4 -
ARGUMENT
The district court found that the decision whether to purchase health
insurance is an economic decision that, in the aggregate, has a significant effect on
the national health care market. Accordingly, section 1501 was rationally related
to Congress’s objective of reforming the health care system to provide medical
insurance to most Americans. The district court also rejected appellants’
arguments that the decision not to purchase health insurance is “inactivity,” that
Congress lacks the power under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses
to regulate that decision, and that upholding section 1501 would usurp the power
preserved to the States and the people in the tenth amendment. In this appeal,
appellants’ reiterate the arguments rejected by the district court, maintaining that
section 1501 improperly regulates “inactivity” and that Congress lacks the power
under the Commerce Clause to require individuals to purchase a good or service.
Although the decision to forgo insurance has the superficial appearance of
“inaction,” it is, from an economic perspective, nothing of the kind: It is an act
that effectively shifts the burden of paying for inevitable medical problems to
others. As the district court found, it is an act that substantially affects the cost of
health care for other individuals and the overall operation of the interstate health
care and health insurance markets. Section 1501 is a tailored response designed to
ensure that all who can afford it bear a share of the cost of the medical treatments
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- 5 -
they will inevitably demand, rather than imposing those costs largely or entirely on
others. As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held:
The activity of foregoing health insurance and attempting to cover the
cost of health care needs by self-insuring is no less economic than the
activity of purchasing an insurance plan. Thus, the financing of health
care services, and specifically the practice of self-insuring, is
economic activity.11
I. The Unique Economics of the Health Care Industry Make the Minimum
Coverage Provision Necessary
Economists have long recognized that health care has unique characteristics.
Indeed, health care violates almost all of the requirements for markets to yield first
best outcomes (“Pareto optimality”).12 One requirement for market optimality is
that people know what they need, and have full information about how to obtain it.
With health care, in contrast, need is unpredictable and information -- particularly
about the costs of medical treatment -- is much less than complete.
Moreover, optimality requires that individuals’ actions affect only
themselves. This is again not true with respect to health care, where an
individual’s actions have effects far beyond themselves -- both directly (by
11 Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, slip op. at 19 (6th Cir. June 29,
2011) (“Thomas More Law Ctr. II”).
12 Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, Am.
Econ. Review, Dec. 1963, at 941-973; N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of
Economics (5th ed. 2009).
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spreading communicable diseases, for example) and indirectly (by not being
insured and thus shifting costs to others, for example).
Optimality in a market requires also vigorous competition on the part of
providers. Because of substantial market imperfections in medical care, however,
a variety of constraints are imposed on medical care competition, including
licensing requirements and regulation of the provider-patient relationship.
Structural factors in the markets for health care, such as the limited number of
hospitals and primary care physicians, are inconsistent with perfect competition.
As a result of these market failures, economists do not approach the health care
industry with the deference to individual choice or the expectations of optimality
that they do in other markets.
These market failures are the foundation for the field of health economics
and have been an object of study for decades. The paper that launched the field
nearly a half century ago notes that
[t]he failure of the market to insure against uncertainties has created many
social institutions in which the usual assumptions of the market are to some
extent contradicted. The medical profession is only one example, though in
many respects an extreme one.13
That remains true today. Of particular relevance to this case, economists who have
studied health care and health insurance for many decades have concluded that it is
13 Arrow, supra n.12, at 967.
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incorrect to say that people who do not purchase health insurance do not participate
in or affect the markets for medical care and health insurance. Rather, all
participate in the markets for medical services and necessarily affect the market for
health insurance. This conclusion is based on three observations:
1. People cannot avoid medical care with certainty, or be sure that they
can pay for the costs of care if uninsured
Everyone gets sick or suffers an injury at some point in life. When they do,
they generally need and receive medical care. Sickness, and especially injury, are
often unforeseen. People need medical care because of accidents, because of life
situations beyond their control (e.g., cancer, a mental health emergency), because
events turn out different from expected (e.g., chronic care medications fail to stem
a disease), or because of the normal aging process (e.g., joint replacement,
Alzheimer’s disease, congestive heart failure). Accordingly, even if people do not
intend to use medical care, they often end up using it anyway. According to
tabulations from the Medical Expenditure Panel Study, the leading source of data
on national medical spending, 57 percent of the 40 million people uninsured in all
of 2007 used medical services that year.14 By another metric, even the best risk
14 Agency for Health Care Quality and Research, Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey, Summary Data Tables tbl. 1 (hereinafter AHQR Tables), available at
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/tables_compendia_hh_interactive.j
sp?_SERVICE=MEPSSocket0&_PROGRAM=MEPSPGM.TC.SAS&File=HCFY
2007&Table=HCFY2007%5FPLEXP%5F%40&VAR1=AGE&VAR2=SEX&VA
Footnote continued on next page
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adjustment systems used to predict medical spending explain only 25 to 35 percent
of the variation in the costs different individuals incur;15 the vast bulk of spending
needs cannot be forecast.
Moreover, because medical care is so expensive, essentially everyone must
have some access to funds beyond their own resources in order to afford it. In
2007, the average person used $6,305 in personal health care services,16 which is
over 10 percent of the median family’s income that year and approximately 20
percent of the median family’s financial assets.17 Even routine medical
procedures, such as MRIs, CT scans, colonoscopies, mammograms, and childbirth,
to name a few, cost more than many Americans can afford. 18
Footnote continued from previous page
R3=RACETH5C&VAR4=INSURCOV&VAR5=POVCAT07&VAR6=MSA&VA
R7=REGION&VAR8=HEALTH&VARO1=4+17+44+64&VARO2=1&VARO3=
1&VARO4=1&VARO5=1&VARO6=1&VARO7=1&VARO8=1&_Debug=.
15 Ross Winkelman and Syed Mahmud, A Comparative Analysis of Claims-Based
Tools for Health Risk Assessment, Society of Actuaries (Apr. 20, 2007), available
at http://www.soa.org/research/research-projects/health/hlth-risk-assement.aspx.
16 Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., Historic National Health Expenditure
Data, NHE Web Tables, available at
http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/02_NationalHealthAccountsHisto
rical.asp#TopOfPage.
17 Brian K. Bucks et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2004 to 2007:
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, Survey of Current Business,
Feb. 2009, at A2-A56. Houses are not counted toward one’s “financial assets.”
18 The Amici Economists argue that these numbers overstate the medical expenses
of the “young, healthy individuals” who are the target of the mandate. Amici Br.,
supra note 9, at 13. However, even the young and healthy incur medical expenses
Footnote continued on next page
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Those suffering from many common, but costly, medical problems spend
substantially more. For example, medical costs in the year after a colorectal cancer
diagnosis average $25,000, even before expensive new medications;19 pancreatic
cancer treatment costs about $57,000;20 and treatment of a heart attack for 90 days
cost over $20,000 in 1998.21 All told, ranking everyone on the basis of medical
spending, including those who did not use any care, the costs for the top one
percent of that distribution equaled $85,000 on average.22 This amount is 46
percent above median family income and nearly three times the financial assets of
the median family. Indeed, this amount -- $85,000 -- exceeds the total financial
Footnote continued from previous page
beyond the means of most Americans. For example, in 2008, the average in-
hospital cost for a normal live birth was $7,933 with other physician expenses of
$1,380. AHQR, supra note 14, at tbl. 3-A (2008 Mean Expenses per Person with
Care for Selected Conditions by Type of Service), available at
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/quick_tables_results.jsp?Action=S
earch&SearchMethod=1&component=1&subcomponent=0&tableSeries=2&year=-
1.
19 K. Robin Yabroff et al., Costs of Care for Elderly Cancer Patients in the United
States, J. of the Nat’l Cancer Institute, Apr. 29, 2008, at 630-41.
20 Id.
21 David M. Cutler and Mark McClellan, Is Technological Change in Medicine
Worth It?, Health Affairs, September/October 2001, at 11-29.
22 Kaiser Family Foundation, Trends in Health Care Costs and Spending (Mar.
2009), available at www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7692_02.pdf; AHQR, supra
note 14.
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assets of all but the very well-to-do.23 Accordingly, notwithstanding the claims of
appellants, it is very difficult for anyone to commit to paying for medical care on
their own, and only the exceptionally wealthy can even consider doing so.
The combination of the uncertainty of need and the high cost of care when
needed highlights the fundamental distinction that health economists make
between health insurance and medical care. Health insurance is a mechanism for
spreading the costs of medical care across people -- so that some people contribute
to the cost of providing care to others in return for obtaining that contribution from
others when they need care -- or over time -- mitigating the risk of facing
overwhelming costs at a particular time by substituting a lower, regular premium
cost over a longer period. The decision to regulate health insurance is not based on
any normative view about the benefits of medical care for any particular person.
2. Other legislation mandates access to a minimum level of health care
for all who seek it, even those who cannot pay
Existing federal legislation requires care to be provided to the very sick,
even if they cannot pay for it. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
(“EMTALA”)24 mandates that hospitals that take Medicare, and virtually all do,
23 Bucks et al., supra, n.17, at A27. This study reports that the median value of the
direct and indirect stock holdings of all families with income below all the 90th
percentile was $62,000 in 2007. Indirect stock holdings include pooled investment
trusts, retirement accounts, and other managed accounts.
24 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
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stabilize patients who come to their emergency rooms with emergency conditions
without regard to whether they can pay for the care they need. Long before
EMTALA, most hospitals provided this charity care as part of their mission.25
This tradition of assuring the availability of some minimal level of treatment to all
Americans without regard to ability to pay reflects a collective decision that we, as
a nation, are generally unwilling to see others come to great harm for lack of
access to medical care.
There are many other respects in which the special nature of health care
justifies imposing unique restrictions on private actors in the health care system.
Because medical care is not an ordinary commodity, physicians owe their patients
a duty26 to provide care and are not free to contract over the terms of treatment in
the same manner as other buyers and sellers.27 For example, medical care
25 Rosemary Stevens, In Sickness and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the
Twentieth Century (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1999); Charles Rosenberg, The
Care of Strangers: The Rise of America’s Hospital System, (Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press 1995); David Rosner, A Once Charitable Enterprise: Hospitals and Health
Care in Brooklyn and New York 1885-1915 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1982).
26 See Jill R. Horwitz, The Multiple Common Law Roots of Charitable Immunity:
An Essay in Honor of Richard Epstein’s Contributions to Tort Law, J. Tort L., Jan.
2010, at 29-33.
27 See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963)
(finding that even though a patient may understand the significance of a contract
releasing a hospital from potential liability in exchange for medical care, hospitals
may not benefit from these exculpatory clauses because of the special way in
which health care affects the public interest).
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providers must ensure that their patients are informed before they give consent to
their treatment. Additionally, physicians are bound under a common law duty not
to abandon their patients once a physician-patient relationship is established. The
physician has an obligation to provide care throughout an episode of illness and
may not terminate the relationship unless certain restrictive conditions are met
(such as when the patient dismisses the physician or the physician gives the patient
sufficient notice and opportunity to find alternate, sufficient treatment).28 These
requirements for severing the physician-patient relationship apply even if the
patient cannot pay for his care.29
The obligation to provide medical care without regard to ability to pay
necessarily imposes costs that must be borne by others, either through taxes or
through cost shifting that increases the costs for those who are able to pay, whether
personally or through insurance. Economists variously term these induced costs an
externality (a situation where one person’s actions or inactions affects others), a
free-rider problem (where people buy a good and leave the costs to others), or a
28 See, e.g., Saunders v. Lischkoff, 188 So. 815, 819 (Fla. 1939) (noting that the
obligation of continuing treatment can only be terminated “by the cessation of the
necessity which gave rise to the relation of physician and patient, or by the
discharge of the physician by the patient, or by the physician’s withdrawing from
the case, after giving the proper notice.” ); accord, e.g., Lewis v. Capalbo, 280
A.D.2d 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Magana v. Elie, 439 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1982).
29 See, e.g., Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208 (Utah 1937) (finding that the doctor did
not give sufficient notice to allow his patient to procure other medical attention).
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Samaritan’s dilemma (where people choose not to be prepared for emergencies,
knowing that others will care for them if needed). Economics textbooks stress that
externalities require government intervention to improve the functioning of the
market.30
3. Whether one person buys health insurance has cost
implications for everyone else
Economists recognize that the time dimension affects individual decision-
making. For most goods and services, the moment of purchase is different from
the moment of consumption (purchase almost always precedes consumption).
Thus, the decision to forgo insurance cannot be separated from the consequences
of being without insurance, and no economic model treats them as separate. The
consequences are three-fold. First, the decision not to purchase insurance may be
followed by illness, requiring medical care financed by others. Second, people
may forgo preventive care while uninsured (such as a mammogram or
colonoscopy) and sa a result require more care later (for example, when diagnosed
with advanced cancer). Third, people may only receive partial care when they are
uninsured and sick, and then use more care when they become insured.
In each of these circumstances, uninsured persons impose costs on others
even if one does not seek medical care in the onset of an illness. Consequently, the
30 N. Gregory Mankiw, supra n.12.
USCA Case #11-5047      Document #1316642      Filed: 07/05/2011      Page 29 of 49
- 14 -
lack of health insurance does have real and significant impacts on interstate
commerce that are far different from any impact resulting from other decisions
about insurance. Because health care providers are required to care for the sick
regardless of whether they have insurance or the means to pay, and because
medical care is so expensive, particularly when people are very sick, the cost of
people choosing to be without coverage is necessarily shared with others. The
medical care used by each uninsured person costs about $2,000 per year, on
average.31 Only 35 to 38 percent of this total is paid for by the uninsured directly
31 The Amici Economists argue that the targets of the mandate, those between 18
and 34 who are healthy and do not have health insurance, spent only $854 on
average for health care in 2010 and only $56 per year on average in total
emergency room care. Amici Br., supra n. 9, at 13-14. That argument suffers from
several defects. First, the “targets” of the individual mandate are not limited to the
healthy under 34. Many over the age of 34 have elected not to purchase insurance.
They include, inter alia, those who were eligible for an employer-provided plan
but decided to not to purchase the insurance and those for whom the costs of health
insurance were too high either because (i) they are not eligible to participate in an
employer program or (ii) the costs of the insurance, including catastrophe
coverage, on the open market was beyond their means. For example, in 2008, the
average non-group policy for individuals aged 30-34 cost $2,104 and $4,512 for
families. AHIP Ctr. for Policy and Research, Individual Health Insurance (Oct.
2009), available at
www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/2009IndividualMarketSurveyFinalReport.pdf; U.S.
Census Bureau, People Without Health Insurance Coverage by Selected
Characteristics: 2008 and 2009 tbl. 8, available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/data/incpovhlth/2009/tab8.pdf.
Second, the average spent on health care or for an emergency room visit in a
year ignores the actual costs to the individual who requires care. During 2008, the
average costs for individuals who visited an emergency room was $1,203 and for
those who were hospitalized, the hospital cost was $7,921. See AHQR Tables,
Footnote continued on next page
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in out-of-pocket payments.32 This is not true of the other necessities, including
food, water, and clothing cited by the appellants.
The remainder is financed in several ways. 32 percent of the total is paid for
by providers charging higher prices to the insured, as providers cost-shift33 from
the uninsured to the insured. The total amount of cost shifting is over $40 billion
per year, and the increase in private insurance premiums resulting from this cost
shifting has been estimated at between 1.7 percent34 and 8.7 percent.35 Another 14
percent of the costs of the uninsured are paid for by government, through Medicare
and Medicaid payments, and services used through the VA, TriCare (medical
insurance for the military and their families), and by workers’ compensation.
Higher government costs attributable to the uninsured are implicitly paid for by the
Footnote continued from previous page
supra note 14, at tbl. 5 (Hospital Inpatient Services-Median and Mean Expenses
per Person with Expense and Distribution of Expenses by Source of Payment
(2008)), available at
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/quick_tables_results.jsp?compone
nt=1&subcomponent=0&tableSeries=1&year=-
1&SearchMethod=1&Action=Search.
32 AHQR Tables, supra note 14; Jack Hadley et al., Covering the Uninsured in
2008: Current Costs, Sources of Payment, and Incremental Costs, Health Affairs,
Aug. 25, 2008, at w399-w415.
33 Hadley et al., supra n. 32.
34 Id.
35 Families USA, Paying a Premium: The Added Cost of Care for the Uninsured 35
(June 2005), available at
www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/Paying_a_Premium_rev_July_13731e.pdf.
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insured as well, through increased taxes or reductions in other government services
as money is spent on the uninsured. Finally, the remaining costs are generally
either borne by the health-care providers or covered by philanthropic contributions
to hospitals and other medical providers.
Moreover, even people who are able to avoid using medical care when they
are without health insurance affect the amount paid by others, in two ways. First,
when some, relatively healthier people, refrain from buying health insurance, that
raises the premiums of the people who wish to purchase insurance, a phenomenon
termed “adverse selection.” Second, when people who were previously uninsured
for a period of time do obtain coverage, they tend to consume more care, resulting
in greater costs to the system. They often have delayed access to primary,
preventive, and chronic care and thus become sicker over time.36 When acute
illness occurs, they may be insured through public or private insurance, thus
increasing the amount that those programs spend. For example, Medicare
beneficiaries who were uninsured prior to becoming eligible for Medicare used 51
percent more services than those who were insured prior to Medicare eligibility.37
These costs are largely paid for by people who are insured, who pay higher taxes
36 Comm.on the Consequences of Uninsurance, Inst. of Medicine, Health Insurance
is a Family Matter 106 (2002).
37 J. Michael McWilliams et al., Use of Health Services by Previously Uninsured
Medicare Beneficiaries, New Eng. J. Med., July 12, 2007, at 143-153.
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for Medicare when they are working, pay higher premiums for Part B coverage
when they are enrolled in Medicare, or receive fewer government services because
of the higher cost of Medicare.
Adverse selection causes the premiums for health insurance to increase as a
result of a smaller and less healthy pool of insured persons. The increase in
premium costs also causes additional people -- many of whom are healthy -- to opt
out of the market, raising prices even higher. The end result of this process of
individuals opting-out or waiting to purchase health insurance will be significantly
lower coverage, and possibly an unraveling of the market as a whole, what is
widely termed an adverse selection “death spiral.”38 In most states, insurers
attempt to counter adverse selection by discriminating against the ill, through
denials of coverage or exclusion of pre-existing conditions. These responses
prevent those most in need from having access to the cost-spreading benefits of
insurance, thus defeating a fundamental purpose of insurance and further
compounding the problem of uncompensated care.
Unfortunately, simply removing these tools from the reach of insurance
companies does not solve the problem; insurers react by raising prices for all
market participants to guard themselves against losses from selling only to the sick.
38 David M. Cutler and Sarah Reber, Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-off
between Competition and Adverse Selection, Q. J. of Econ., May 1998, at 433-466.
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Several states have tried mandating coverage of individuals with pre-existing
conditions, non-discrimination in insurance pricing, and other similar reforms of
their markets for individuals’ policies, without the equivalent of a minimum
coverage requirement. All of these state experiments failed, and the states that
tried them are now among the most expensive states in which to buy non-group
insurance.39 The only economic solution to this dilemma is to ensure broad
participation in insurance pools by all people. The minimum coverage requirement
is a reasonable way to do this.
II. Upholding Section 1501 Will Not Give Congress Unfettered Power to
Impose New Mandates on Individuals
The unique characteristics of health care described in the preceding section
demonstrate why upholding the minimum coverage provision will not lead to
equivalent federal interventions in other markets. The combination of the
unavoidable need for medical care; the unpredictability of such need; the high cost
of care, which in many situations far outstrips an individual’s or family’s ability to
pay; the fact that providers cannot refuse to provide care in emergency situations,
and generally will not in many other situations; and the very significant cost-
shifting that underlies the way medical care is paid for in this country,
39 Jonathan Gruber and Sara Rosenbaum, Buying Health Care, The Individual
Mandate, and the Constitution, New Eng. J. Med., July 29, 2010, at 401-03.
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cumulatively combine to create a set of conditions and needs that do not exist in
other contexts.
While there are other necessities of life, they do not have the economic
characteristics of health care. Because the need for such items is relatively certain
in amount and time, people do not insure against the risk that they will need food
or shelter. Rather, they plan for those needs, even when their means are limited.
Nor are grocery stores or landlords required to provide food or housing to the
needy even if they cannot afford to pay. So too, while many families purchase
homes, purchasing a home is a discretionary decision as living quarters can be
rented.
By contrast, virtually all will require health care at some point, medical
providers are obligated to provide care, and the costs of much medical care --
especially the most-costly care -- occur unpredictably. These expenses cannot be
deferred nor can care be provided in other ways. Rather, the costs are largely
borne by others when incurred by an uninsured party.
Similarly, appellants’ attempt to equate health insurance with other forms of
insurance, such as burial, life, supplemental income, credit, mortgage guarantee,
etc.,40 is unavailing. Each of those forms of insurance involves risk-spreading, but
none deals with the combination of unavoidable need, unpredictable need,
40 Appellants Br. at 35.
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unpredictable costs, the obligation to provide service, and the cost-shifting that
characterizes the health care market. Several provide coverage for risks that may
not occur, e.g., mortgage guarantee insurance, and others are a form of savings
account, e.g., burial insurance, or a timing bet with an insurance company, e.g.,
term life. The health care market is unique in its scope and characteristics, and
none of the parallels appellants and others have attempted to draw with other
markets withstands analysis.
Congress enacted ACA to address failures in the health care insurance
market that make it prohibitively difficult for many individuals to afford or obtain
health insurance and produce escalating health care costs for consumers and
taxpayers.41 The decision to require most individuals who can afford it to obtain
health insurance is a reasonable approach, as a matter of economics, to satisfying
the Congress’s overarching goals in reforming health insurance and creating a
fairer and more efficient health care system.42 The economic characteristics and
principles that underlie this conclusion are not common to other markets. None
involves the unavoidable need, the unpredictability, the high costs, the inability of
41 See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 633 (W.D. Va. 2010);
Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 894-95 (E.D. Mich. 2010)
(“Thomas More Law Ctr. I”).
42 See J. Gruber, Health Care Reform without the Individual Mandate, Ctr. for Am.
Progress (Feb. 2011), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/gruber_mandate.html.
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providers to refuse to provide treatment, and the very significant cost-shifting that
underlies the way medical care is paid for in this country. Section 1501 is a
measured response to these a unique characteristics of the health care market.
Upholding that necessary corrective measure will not open the floodgates of
unfettered federal power to require individuals to purchase goods and services or
engage in activity that may be good for them.
III. The Decision to Forgo Health Care Insurance Directly Affects Interstate
Commerce.
A. The Decision to Forego Health Care Insurance Is Not a Passive
Decision.
Appellants argue at length that the decision not to purchase health insurance
is not subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause because it is “inactivity.”
However, a large number of studies in health economics show that the decision to
forgo purchasing health insurance is not a passive act that may be attributed to the
passage of time or inadvertence. Rather, it is a considered decision driven by
economic factors. Those studies indicate that the decision of whether to purchase
health insurance or not responds in a manner strongly predicted by models of
forward-looking behavior, and thus that many individuals forgo insurance as a
result of strategic thinking.
One finding supporting this view is that about one-quarter of the uninsured
reject the offer of employer-sponsored insurance and remain uninsured, despite the
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significant subsidies that virtually all employers offer for employer-sponsored
insurance.43 Other studies show that individuals are more likely to remain
uninsured when there are more sources of “uncompensated care” available, such as
public hospitals or hospitals that have high uncompensated care spending; the
ability to receive free care plays into the decision to be covered.44
Evidence of strategic decisionmaking is also reflected in studies showing
that when public insurance is expanded to some family members, such as children,
families will often drop insurance for all members of the family to take advantage
of the partial coverage for children. This exposes the ineligible family members to
being uninsured but leads to overall benefits for the family.45 Finally, evidence
from Massachusetts shows that even under the insurance mandate there, some
people signed up for insurance but terminated their coverage within a year; those
individuals who dropped coverage were much sicker than the typical person in the
43 Jonathan Gruber and Ebonya Washington, Subsidies to Employee Health
Insurance Premiums and the Health Insurance Market, J. of Health Econ., Mar.
2005, at 253-76.
44 Kevin N. Rask and Kimberly J. Rask, Public Insurance Substituting for Private
Insurance: New Evidence Regarding Public Hospitals, Uncompensated Care
Funds, and Medicaid, J. of Health Econ., Jan. 19, 2000.
45 David Cutler and Jonathan Gruber, The Effect of Expanding the Medicaid
Program on Public Insurance, Private Insurance, and Redistribution, Am. Econ.
Review, May 1996, at 368-73.
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market.46 The costs of allowing people to opt in and out of coverage -- the
“adverse selection” -- was estimated to increase insurance premiums by 0.5 to 1.5
percent, and ending this loophole -- which Massachusetts has done -- would lower
costs for everyone in the market by 1.2 percent. These data demonstrate that
forgoing health insurance is frequently not “inactivity,” as the appellants maintain,
but an affirmative, rational economic decision.
In Thomas More Law Center II, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
recognized the logical incoherence of the activity / inactivity distinction when it
comes to insuring against financial risk in the health care market.47 As Judge
Sutton explained in his controlling opinion:
[n]o one is inactive when deciding how to pay for health care, as self-
insurance and private insurance are two forms of action for addressing
the same risk. Each requires affirmative choices; one is no less active
than the other; and both affect commerce.48
46 Dianna K. Welch & Kurt Giesa, Oliver Wyman, Analysis of Individual Health
Coverage in Massachusetts Before and After the July 1, 2007 Merger of the Small
Group and Nongroup Health Insurance Markets 2-3 (June 2010),
http://www.mass.gov/Eoca/docs/doi/Companies/adverse_selection_report.pdf.
47 No. 10-2388, slip op. at 19, 45, 57-58 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (2-1 decision).
48 Id. at 45.
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B. The Decision to Forgo Health Care Insurance Has A Material
Impact on Interstate Commerce.
Appellants claim also that the decision to forgo health insurance has no
impact on interstate commerce.49 However, that analysis fails to recognize, as
noted above, that those without medical insurance often ignore medical conditions
at their earlier stages and incur significantly greater costs when they ultimately
seek aid. So too, the decision to forgo some types of curative care, can result in
more of that care in the future, after the patient obtains coverage. The collective
effect of individual decisions not to purchase health insurance affects the costs of
health care insurance premiums, the coverage which insurance companies can
provide at reasonable rates, and the extent to which the costs of providing health
care to the uninsured are borne by others, including the taxpayer. The total costs of
uncompensated care in 2008 alone were at least $43 billion.50
In their brief in Florida v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, the
“Amici Economists” claim that the real uncompensated cost is only $8 billion.
They arrive at that reduced figure by arguing that certain categories of
49 See Appellants Br. at 32 (quoting Florida ex rel. Bondi, No. 3:10-cv-91, 2011
WL 285683, at *26 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011)).
50 Congress used this figure, based on a Congressional Budget Office report, in
enacting ACA. However, it may understate the actual uncompensated costs in
2008. See Hadley, supra n. 32, at 403 (estimating the cost of total uncompensated
care at $56 billion, of which $43 billion is the government portion.)
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“uncompensated costs … will not be affected by the individual mandate… .”51
Their analysis makes a number of basic errors in the description of those costs, and
ignores the interrelationship between the independent mandate and the insurance
reforms adopted in the Act.
1. The Amici Economists’ Analysis is flawed
The Amici Economists’ analysis excludes all of the costs of uncompensated
care provided to uninsured individuals with chronic conditions, which is asserted
to amount to $8.7 billion. They argue that, as a result of provisions of ACA
making health insurance more broadly available, those individuals will now obtain
insurance voluntarily. However, this argument presumes, without support, that all
individuals with any chronic condition are uninsured solely because of a lack of
availability, and ignores the likelihood that some in this group -- especially given
the Amici Economists’ broad definition of chronic conditions (including asthma,
arthritis and high blood pressure) -- would likely to choose to remain uninsured
even in a reformed market. More importantly, the analysis presumes that market
reforms of the type required under ACA can be sustained in the absence of an
individual coverage requirement. As discussed below, this is a highly questionable
assumption.
51 Amici Br., supra note 9, at 11. While $8 billion is less than $43 billion, it is not
a trivial sum.
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The Amici Economists argue also that any uncompensated care used by
those below 133 percent of the poverty line should be ignored since those
individuals will be eligible for free Medicaid care. However, this claim mistakenly
assumes that all of these individuals are uninsured, when, in fact, some have
insurance. Moreover, it falsely assumes that everyone eligible for the expanded
Medicaid coverage would choose to take it. Since there are millions of low income
individuals now eligible for free Medicaid coverage who do not sign up, that
assumption is questionable. Facing a minimum coverage requirement, these
individuals would be induced to sign up for Medicaid.
The Amici Economists also subtract from the $43 billion roughly $8.1
billion in uncompensated care allegedly attributable to “illegal aliens and other
nonresidents.” But the question in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey on
which this analysis relies covers care used by all non-citizens.52 As section 1501
includes anyone who is lawfully present in the United States,53 the $8.1 billion
includes lawful residents who are subject to the minimum coverage requirement.
The Amici Economists exclude $3.3 billion of uncompensated care due to
the insured who do not make their co-pays or other out-of-pocket expenses.
52 Leighton Ku, Health Insurance Coverage and Medical Expenditures of
Immigrants and Native-Born Citizens in the United States, Am. J. of Pub. Health,
July 2009, at 1322-28.
53 See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d).
USCA Case #11-5047      Document #1316642      Filed: 07/05/2011      Page 42 of 49
- 27 -
However, the $43 billion in uncompensated costs includes only costs due to the
uninsured, and the $3.3 billion in costs attributable to insured people is not part of
the total.
Further, the $43 billion figure reflects 2008 costs. Updating the
uncompensated care amounts to account for health care inflation by the time of the
mandate’s implementation in 2014 would increase the total to perhaps $58 billion,
assuming projections.54 Given the rise of the uninsured since 2008, the likely
figures may be even higher. Consequently, the Amici Economists’ attempt to
demonstrate that those subject to the mandate, i.e., those without health insurance
who would respond only to the mandate, have little impact on health care costs is
seriously flawed.
2. The Amici Economists Ignore the Importance of the Mandate to
the Insurance Reforms Adopted in the Act
More fundamentally, the Amici Economists’ assertion that the $43 billion
can be discounted because of coverage which the Act will make available ignores
the interaction of the individual mandate and the guaranteed coverage and the
community rating provisions of the Act. As discussed above, the decisions as to
when and whether to acquire or drop coverage can affect whether these reforms
54 Ctr. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., National Health Expenditure Projections
2009-2019 (Sept. 2010),
http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/NHEProjections2009t
o2019.pdf .
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can be maintained. Thus, for example, the collective effect of individual decisions
to purchase insurance once a medical condition arises or on the way to the
emergency room or to drop coverage once the condition is resolved could lead to
the “death spiral” discussed above: healthy people drop out of the market,
insurance premiums rise, and more people are induced to drop coverage.
One goal of the mandate, as explicitly recognized section 1501 (a) (2) (I), is
to “broaden the health risk pool” in order to minimize the chances of such
unraveling.55 This is not purely a theoretical possibility: As noted above, the few
states that experimented with insurance market reforms of this type without a
mandate saw the unraveling of their non-group markets and very high premiums.
Consequently, the validity of the Amici Economists’ analysis, even assuming that
their numbers are correct, turns on the continued availability of the insurance
market reforms in the Act. Without the mandate, those reforms may not be
sustainable, leaving millions reliant on uncompensated care for their health care
needs.56
55 Studies of the Massachusetts experience indicates that the mandate actually
encourages healthier individuals to purchase insurance. Amitabh Chandra et al.,
The Importance of the Individual Mandates -- Evidence from Massachusetts, N.
Engl. J. Med., Jan. 27, 2011, at 293-95, available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/pdf/gruber_mandate.pdf.
56 Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Without the Mandate, Replacing the
Individual Mandate would Significantly Erode Coverage Gains and Raise
Premiums for Health Care Consumers, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Feb. 9, 2011,
Footnote continued on next page
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, amici urge the Court to affirm the decision
below and uphold section 1501. Spreading the costs of medical care across the
broad spectrum of the population that will require medical assistance is essential to
reforming the health care system in the United States and achieving the legitimate
goals of the Act.
While the minimum coverage requirement may appear unique, it is, as an
economic matter, consistent with the other obligations imposed under the
Commerce Clause. As the district court held, it is a regulation of economic
decisions that have a substantial impact on the national market for health care.
Given the unique economic characteristics of health care, upholding that necessary
corrective measure will not grant Congress unfettered federal power to require
individuals to purchase goods and services, to engage in activity that may be good
for them, or to usurp the police powers of the States.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Hadrian R. Katz
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